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Nelson Chamisa v Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and Others CCZ 42/18 (August 
2018) 
O’Brien Kaaba 
 
Facts 
Zimbabwe held its first post-Mugabe general elections on 30th July 2018. On 3rd August 2018, 
the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) declared Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as 
the candidate who received the requisite ‘more than half the number of votes cast’ and declared 
duly elected President of Zimbabwe. Aggrieved by this development, Nelson Chamisa, the 
main opposition contender, challenged the validity of the election of Mnangagwa in the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
Holding 
After hearing the case, the Constitutional Court unanimously: 
1) Dismissed the application with costs; and 
2) Declared Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as duly elected President of Zimbabwe. 
 
Significance 
This case note is based on the abridged judgment of the Constitutional Court. Ideally the note 
should have been based on the full reasoned judgment of the Court. However, at the time of 
writing, more than a year since the handing down of the abridged judgment, the full reasoned 
judgment had not yet been given.  
 
The case is important as it is the first post-Mugabe presidential election petition. In a sense, the 
case was a test of the Zimbabwean judiciary’s commitment to the possibility of contributing to 
the democratic rebuilding and affirmation of constitutionalism in the immediate aftermath of 
the dictatorial Mugabe era that destroyed key governance institutions, leaving them beholden 
to the ruling elite. From the African continental perspective, it could also be said that the case 
was an opportunity for the African judiciary to build on the precedent set by the Kenyan 
Supreme Court in 2017 that nullified the presidential election and elaborated a jurisprudence 
that is contextually relevant in redressing electoral fraud. 
 
The decision by the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court, however, suggests that the Court failed 
to grab the opportunity to contribute to more democratic jurisprudence that reflects 
constitutional norms and values. In fact, the Court seemed to frown on the petitioner having 
exercised his constitutional right to challenge the election. This can be gleaned from the first 
order the court made. The Court tersely stated: ‘The application is dismissed with costs.’ 
Though short, this expression is weighty as it means the applicant had to bear the costs of all 
the parties in the case (featuring 25 respondents). It is unheard of in Anglophone Africa for a 
court to order costs in a constitutional matter of grave national interest. A perusal of presidential 
election judgments from similar jurisdictions such as Zambia (1996,1 2001,2 20163), Uganda 
                                                          
1 Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika and Others v Fredrick Jacob Titus Chiluba (1998) ZR 49 
2 Anderson Kambela Mazoka and Others v Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and Others (2005) ZR 138 
3 Hakainde Hichilema and Another V Edgar Lungu and others 2016/CC/0031 Ruling No.33 of 2016 
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(2001,4 2006,5 20166), Kenya (20137 and 20178), Ghana (20139) and Nigeria (200310 and 
200711) demonstrates that costs are not usually ordered in such matters. 
Challenging a presidential election is an exercise of a fundamental constitutional entitlement 
that should not carry any risk of costs. The importance of this was forcefully stated by the 
Supreme Court in Zambia: 
 
As we have always said on costs in matters of this nature, it is in the interest of the 
proper function of our democracy that challenges to the election of the president, which 
are permitted by the Constitution and which are not frivolous should not be inhibited 
by unwarranted condemnation in costs.12 
 
In this Zambian case, the Supreme Court dismissed the presidential election petition, but 
considered that that alone did not mean there were no grievances upon which the applicant 
could seek redress, despite the complaints not rising to the requisite level that would warrant 
nullifying an election.  
 
The South African Constitutional Court has elaborated a three-fold rationale for ordinarily not 
ordering costs in constitutional matters.13 First, it diminishes the chilling effect that an adverse 
costs order can have on parties asserting constitutional rights and might have the effect of 
citizens foregoing meritorious claims. Second, constitutional litigation, regardless of the 
outcome, might bear not only on the interests of litigants directly involved in a matter, but may 
have consequences on the rights of others similarly situated. Third, it is the state that bears 
primary responsibility for ensuring that both the law and state conduct are consistent with the 
constitution.14 
 
The fact that the Court did not find in favour of a litigant is not sufficient warrant to order costs. 
The Court must take a broad look at matters raised and consider how a costs order may hinder 
or promote the advancement of justice.15 Writing for the unanimous Lesotho Court of Appeal, 
Justice Musonda held that in constitutional matters, even if a litigant laboured under the 
misconception that they had a good case, that alone is not sufficient ground for the court to 
order costs when the case is lost.16 
 
                                                          
4 Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Museveni Electoral Petition No. 1 of 2001 
5 Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2006 
6 Amama Mbabazi v Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and Others Presidential Election Petition No. 01 of 2016 
7 Raila Odinga vs. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and others Supreme Court Petition 
No. 5,3 and 4 of 2013 
8 Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others 
Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2017 
9 Nana Addo vs. John Dramani No J2/6/2013 Judgment of 29 August 2015 
10 Muhammadu Buhari and others vs. Olusegun Obasanjo and others SC.133/2003 17 NWLR (2003) 
11 Atiku Abubakar and others vs. Musa Umaru Yar’adua and others SC.72/2008 Supreme Court of Nigeria 
Judgement of 12 December 2008 
12 Anderson Kambela Mazoka and Others v Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and Others (2005) ZR 138 
13 Trustees for the Time Being of the Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others [2009] ZACC 
14, para 23 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid, para 16 
16 Kananelo Mosito and Others v Qhalehang Letsika and Others Court of Appeal (Civil) 9/2018, para 50. See 
also The President of the Court of Appeal v The Prime Minister and Others Court of Appeal (Civil) 62/2013, 
para 27 
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Allowing aggrieved parties to seek relief in the courts without risking being condemned to 
costs potentially opens the courts widely to the people, or as Prempeh put it, it allows judges 
to ‘take the courts to the people.’17 This would ensure that courts become the commonly used 
avenues for resolution of contested democratic claims as opposed to resort to street violence or 
other self-help means. 
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the award of costs in constitutional matters is governed by the 
Constitutional Court Rules 2016.18 Rule 55(1) provides: ‘Generally no costs are awarded in a 
constitutional matter: Provided that, in an appropriate case, the Court or judge, as the case may 
be, may make such order of costs as it or he or she deems fit.’ The Court in this case never 
even referred to this authority, nor did it give any explanation justifying the award of costs. In 
the absence of a cogent justification for an award of costs, the Court could be said to have acted 
arbitrarily and out of spite in order to ‘punish’ the petitioner for exercising his constitutional 
right. Such a decision does not clothe the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court in good light and 
suggests it failed to extricate itself from the feelings of the ruling party and its candidate whose 
election was being challenged. 
Another notable issue in the judgment relates to the nature of evidence the court suggested was 
needed for the applicant to prove his claim. According to the Court, the petitioner should have 
produced source evidence demonstrating the irregularities in the electoral results. This 
evidence could, inter alia, have come from the candidate’s party poll agents and election 
observers, by furnishing the Court with signed copies of election results forms (Form VII) from 
polling stations. In the words of the Court: 
 
The applicant was at large to have his polling station agents at each and every polling 
station around the country. Observers were also free to participate in the process. The 
applicant’s agents would have observed the voters arriving, being given the ballot 
papers as applicants for these papers before the presiding officers, going to vote in 
secret in the booths, and having the vote counted in their presence if they were there. 
At the end of the counting all agents would have signed the VII form if they so wished 
and given copies. 
 
In the view of the Court, if the evidence from the agents and observers from polling stations 
was produced, it would have answered all questions to do with allegations of manipulating the 
results. The Court further thought that an election should not be easily nullified as the 
declaration of results gave rise to a presumption of validity. 
 
Although this approach looks innocuous on the surface, on close examination it gives the 
impression of a Court that is scared to confront the electoral disputes presented before it head-
on, without excuses. As John Hatchard has argued, such an approach ‘can be seen as a way of 
ensuring that the most sensitive of political questions is avoided.’19 Two short-comings of this 
approach can be noted. First, in this computer technology era, results of an election can be 
manipulated regardless of, or even more aptly, in spite of having party agents and observers at 
the polling stations. This possibility is well illustrated by the 2017 Kenyan Supreme Court 
decision.20 In nullifying the election, the Supreme Court was convinced that the results were 
                                                          
17 H Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Marbury in Africa’s Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in 
Contemporary Africa’ (2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 65 
18 Statutory Instrument 61 of 2016 
19 John Hatchard, ‘Election Petitions and the Standard of Proof’ (2015) 27 Denning Law Journal 300 
20 Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others 
Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017 
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tampered with in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission’s (IEBC) servers. The 
IEBC itself was complicit in the fraud. In this case, reports from observers were of no use at 
all, as the Supreme Court pointed out: ‘The interim reports [of observers] cannot therefore be 
used to authenticate the transmission and eventual declaration of results.’21 Considering that 
Chamisa made similar allegations of election results tampering as was the case with the 2017 
Kenyan elections, the Court should have been more open to the possibility of elections being 
manipulated not just at the polling station but in the national tabulation process, and to the 
possibility that the ZEC may have been complicit. 
 
Second, the presumption of validity of an election lacks any demonstrable basis in the 
Zimbabwean Constitution, or any modern liberal constitutional law theory. The Court’s role as 
a guardian of constitutionalism is to enforce constitutional values, in this case, the values of 
allowing people to choose their own leaders in an environment that allows the collective and 
genuine will of the people to prevail. As such, state institutions cannot be presumed, without 
critically clearing every reasonable allegation, to administer a credible election. The 
constitutional norms that entitle citizens to political participation and genuine elections also 
bind public institutions and, therefore, state institutions should not enjoy any privileges and 
presumptions in their favour. As the Kenyan Court in 2017 showed, such state institutions may 
not always utilize their power for the common good but use it to manipulate systems for narrow 
interests. It is, therefore, the duty of the electoral court to ensure that every little allegation is 
properly assessed and to this effect, state institutions responsible for conducting elections 
should not have any benefit of the assumption that they conducted their affairs prudently. This 
approach was recently used by the Austrian Constitutional Court when it nullified that 
country’s 2016 presidential election. It stated: 
 
Therefore, not only individual possible incidents of manipulation, which are potentially 
more likely, such as the invalidation of votes, but rather all theoretically possible forms 
of manipulation and abuse have to be taken into account; because as explained above 
the legal provisions intended to safeguard the electoral principles are also to serve as 
protection against manipulation and abuse by the state itself as the organizer of the 
elections.22 (emphasis the author’s) 
 
The role of the electoral court in a constitutional democracy should be to enforce constitutional 
norms and not take pre-determined positions. It should be open to assess all possible allegations 
and consider state agencies administering elections as equally bound to constitutional standards 
as everyone else. The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court had an opportunity to do this. It had a 
further opportunity to devise contextually relevant mechanisms of responding to local 
democratic needs of the country and help rebuild the democratic aspirations of the Zimbabwean 
people, taking the example of the Kenyan Supreme Court in 2017. This however, is not to argue 
that the Court should have invalidated the election, but that it should have presided over the 
dispute as a neutral enforcer of constitutional values. The abridged judgment, however, 
suggests the opportunity may have been missed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Ibid  
22 Heinz-Christian Strache and Others v Federal Electoral Commission and Others Constitutional Court W 
6/2016-125 (1 July 2016), page 159. 
